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Media Pluralism and the Overlapping Instruments Needed to Achieve it.  
Professor Richard Collins and Professor Martin Cave. 
Richard.Collins.2@city.ac.uk  Martin.E.Cave@btinternet.com  
Abstract. 
The authors review recent scholarly and policy initiatives in respect of media pluralism and 
argue that contradictions between policy objectives, in analytical approaches and deficiencies 
in some established methodologies mean that robust conclusions have been hard to secure. 
They argue that concerns about diminishing pluralism are likely to grow in consequence of 
changes in a dominant “legacy media” funding model as advertising revenues move online. 
Examining UK data, they argue that a contemporary focus of concern, growing concentration 
in privately owned media, is overshadowed by the striking dominance of the publicly owned 
BBC and suggest established analytical methodologies used to analyse market power may 
offer a valuable analogy in the definition and measurement of pluralism issues. They consider 
possible alternatives to regulation as means of enhancing pluralism and propose the use of 
subsidised entry.  
Keywords. 
Policy and Law (Media systems), Internet, International Communications, Public Service 
Broadcasting, Media Ownership, Economics of Media.  
  
1. Introduction.  
Concerns about media pluralism are pervasive. In Australia, media ownership regulation 
came under review in 2001 (updated in 2002, 2003 and 2006) and again in 2007 (Parliament 
of Australia 2001 and 2007). In Canada, the Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) promulgated new media ownership rules in 2008 
(CRTC 2008). In October 2011, a European Commission Vice-President, Neelie Kroes, 
established a Committee on Freedom and Pluralism of the Media “to advise and provide 
recommendations for the respect, protection, support and promotion of media freedom and 
pluralism in Europe” (European Commission 2011) following extensive earlier studies and 
publications (eg Council of Europe 1994, European Commission 2007 and KUL 2009). In the 
USA, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) began the latest of its four yearly 
reviews of media ownership in 2010 (FCC 2010), though in 2011 most of its earlier 
recommendations for liberalisation of media ownership in the USA were blocked by a 
judgement of the US Court of Appeals (see United States Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit 2011). In Germany, the Kommission zur Ermittlung der Konzentration im 
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Medienbereich (see KEK 2010 and 2011) regulates commercial broadcasting to secure 
diversity of opinion (Meinungsvielfalt), and in the UK Jeremy Hunt, the Secretary of State 
for Culture, Media and Sport, announced that he had asked Ofcom   
to look at whether or not it is practical or advisable to set absolute limits on news 
market share; whether they believe a framework for measuring levels of plurality 
could or should include websites and if so which ones; and whether or how it should 
include the BBC (Hunt 2011).  
Hunt’s mandate to Ofcom followed numerous UK studies on media ownership (see, inter 
alia, House of Lords 2008) and Ofcom’s most recent report (like the FCC, Ofcom is charged 
with regularly reviewing media ownership rules – though triennially rather than in a 
quadrennial cycle) in which, like the FCC, it had recommended (modest) liberalisation 
(Ofcom 2009). Scholarly activity has been no less energetic – see for example the special 
section of the International Journal of Communication on media pluralism (IJOC 2010), 
Czepek et al (2009); Doyle (2002); Harcourt (2005); Hulten et al (2010); Meier (2005) etc. 
Why are such concerns widespread and recurrent? For three reasons, first, there is abundant 
empirical evidence that the partial advertiser-supported model which sustained print media in 
particular is under threat, leading to  closures and merger. Second, in democratic societies, 
the mass media are supposed to have an important political role – both in their purported 
capacity to influence political behaviour (notably voting) and in their purported duty to hold 
power to account. If media ownership is wrongly apportioned, by being insufficiently diverse 
(or/and insufficiently national), then democracy, and the social solidarity on which it is based, 
may be undermined. Regulations which require either or both national and diverse ownership 
are supposed to step into the breach and mitigate these adverse trends. But, third, regulation is 
less and less effective as government control of entry to and shares of media markets declines 
(broadcasting satellites, the internet etc). Here, the focus is on ownership regulation to secure 
pluralism, rather than national ownership, but it is noteworthy that in some jurisdictions a 
striving for national media ownership has had the unwanted effect of diminishing media 
pluralism.  
Many theories of democracy, including those most cited in debates about media policy and 
regulation (notably rooted in Mill, Habermas and Mouffe – see Karpinnen, Moe and 
Svensson 2008), emphasise the importance of diversity. Followers of Mill foreground 
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arguments from On Liberty that:  "if any opinion is compelled to silence, that opinion may, 
for aught we can certainly know, be true. To deny this is to assume our own infallibility" 
(Mill 1986: 115); those of Habermas emphasise the need for an untrammelled forum for 
collective and rational deliberation and those of Mouffe appeal to the inherent pluralism and 
incommensurability of values in modern societies. But all these viewpoints shelter under the 
umbrella of a common rationale, expressed by Bagdikian (1987, 3), that  “Modern 
democracies need a choice of politics and ideas, and that choice requires access to truly 
diverse and competing sources of news, literature, entertainment and popular culture.”   
There can be little doubt that democracy is unlikely to thrive without diverse and competing 
sources of news, although much is left out here - notably the independence of news and the 
media’s capacity to hold power to account. But can there be too much diversity? This may 
seem a fanciful question but too much diversity may lead to fragmentation of the collectivity 
(polity, demos, state, nation or something else) in question. Indeed, this is (one of) the 
rationale(s) underpinning national media content and ownership rules – too much external 
content (or ownership) may lead to a lethal erosion of identification with the demos. Too 
much diversity can weaken the media’s ability to hold power to account.  
Furthermore the presumption that diversity of ownership will necessarily lead to diversity in 
content has seldom been tested - and remains to be demonstrated. Milyo’s recent study for the 
FCC found that: 
local television newscasts for cross-owned stations contain on average about 1-2 
minutes more news coverage overall, or 4%-8% more than the average for non-cross-
owned stations.………. Newspaper cross-ownership is also associated with more 
candidate coverage, more candidate speaking time and more coverage of opinion 
polls………With regard to the partisan slant of news coverage, there is little 
consistent and significant difference between cross-owned stations and other major 
network-affiliated stations in the same market (Milyo 2007: npp). 
Milyo’s findings, which refer to a specific United States context, may not be generalisable, 
but they are remarkable both as a rare empirical enquiry into the ownership/content nexus and 
for putting into question conventional wisdom concerning the relationship between media 
content and ownership. Such multiple uncertainties and contradictions may explain why 
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debates about media ownership seem never to go away. But why do they never seem to reach 
a resolution? 
First, any proposals for change are likely to disadvantage media incumbents, and their 
political allies, who are likely to resist change. All this is simply to state the obvious: media 
ownership regulation is highly political and scholarship too is often highly politicised. 
Change, at least in part, depends not on rational argument but on political interest.  
This has implications for the applicability of recommendations such as those of the Media 
Pluralism Monitor (MPM) –  the European Commission’s most recent engagement with the 
media ownership question (see KUL 2009), which, almost certainly, constitutes the most 
fully elaborated attempt to construct an instrument to measure media pluralism.  
 The MPM eloquently demonstrates the difficulty of reaching rational, impartial and, above 
all, operationalisable assessments of the media pluralism issue. Its 166 indices, 75 possible 
threats and 43 distinct risks (KUL 2009: 89, 92) testify to the heroic labour required for its 
implementation. For example, to reach a conclusion on one of the 166 individual indicators, 
that for determining the extent to which “Political bias in the media” is present, requires a 
“Quantitative content analysis for measuring the proportion of actors representing different 
political viewpoints and groupings by dividing them into 4 groups: government, governing 
parties, opposition parties, and other political and ideological groupings” (KUL 2009: 46). 
The labour involved in reaching such a judgement needs no emphasis and neither does the 
extent to which the judgments involved in making such distinctions are likely to be open to 
question and challenge. Moreover, the MPM methodology’s attribution of “equal weight to 
all indicators” (KUL 2009: 26) is highly contestable: are magazines, radio, television and 
newspapers equivalent and equal in their importance? The problem raised by this question is 
amplified when the importance of book publishing companies, web sites, cable stations and 
others (KUL 2009: 78) has to be taken into consideration. Further, the MPM’s recourse to 
criteria such as “excessive” and “insufficient” (KUL 2009: 35, 37) suggests that considerable 
uncertainty is likely to surround any judgements based on its methodology and that any real 
life use of the MPM is likely to provide ample employment for lawyers. So complex are the 
instrument’s measurements and recommendations that it seems unlikely that it will ever be 
unleashed in anger.  
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Problems of this kind in determining both the rationale and the means of implementing any 
action on media pluralism help to explain why the issue remains, seemingly immovably, on 
the policy and scholarly agendas without resolution. Its high contemporary salience though 
may also reflect recent changes in the economics of the mass media, briefly described in the 
next section.  
2. The commercial background: advertising budgets switch from legacy media to 
the internet. 
The period since 2005 has seen a significant change in the distribution of global advertising 
expenditures, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 Compound annual growth rate (%) of global advertising expenditure in 2005-2010. 
 
All                         -1.0 
Newspapers        -4.3 
Magazines           -3.1 
Television             5.1 
Radio                    -0.7 
Cinema                 6.4 
Outdoor               3.4 
Internet                24.5 




Unsurprisingly, countries differ in the speed at which internet advertising is replacing 
advertising on the traditional media. Thus in the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, 
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China), most notably in China and India, the newspaper sector1 and television advertising 
funding are growing2.  
Figure 1 shows conveniently how the internet’s share of advertising expenditure has risen in 
each of the 12 countries tracked in Ofcom (2010: 214). 
 Figure 1.  
 
Source: Ofcom 2010: 214. 
The UK leads this particular pack, and a further useful Ofcom figure (figure 2 below) 
provides an illuminating possible explanation. It shows the strong apparent correlation 
between internet advertising as a share of total expenditure and measures of broadband 
penetration and the proportion of internet users.  
Figure 2 . Internet advertising share, active internet users, and broadband penetration in the 
UK, 2005-2011. 
                                                          
1 See World Association of Newspapers 2009.  
2 World Press Trends 2009 (World Association of Newspapers 2009: 312) states that 2008 advertising revenues 
in China grew 13.22% for television, 10.21% for the internet and 6.36% for newspapers. Newspaper circulation 
in China has grown year on year between 2004 and 2007 as has, with a downward blip in 2005, the number of 
newspaper titles (World Association of Newspapers 2009: 315). In India, both circulation and number of 




Source: Ofcom 2012a: 229. 
In the period covered by the data in figures 1 and 2, the UK has seen significant numbers of 
newspaper closures and mergers3, notably in the local/regional sector. But the economic 
health of the national press also remains shaky: papers have reduced pagination (eg the 
Financial Times), closed free access to websites (The Times) and raised prices (the Financial 
Times doubled its price between 2007 and 2010 and further increased it in 2012). In 
television Channel 3 (ITV) has foreshadowed closure of its regional news services.  
The decline in advertising spend accruing to “legacy” media thus has several important  
consequences: public access to affordable content (most importantly, news) is likely to 
decline; the quality of content is likely to decline and the plurality of sources of content (most 
importantly, of news) may decline – not least as firms merge in order to reduce costs in 
response to diminishing revenues and/or as control of bottleneck essential facilities 
(subscription management systems, encryption and API protocols, transmission and 
distribution platforms etc) in electronic communications services endows a few firms with 
sufficient market power to exercise dominance. This contributes to pervasive disquiet about 
the future of a robust and pluralistic “fourth estate” – a disquiet for which media 
concentration provides a convenient lightening rod and one particularly attractive when, in 
the UK, the largest commercial media player, putatively exemplifying the baleful 
consequences of concentration, is the Rupert Murdoch/News Corporation/BSkyB nexus of 
media interests.  
                                                          
3 See, for example, the table showing declining circulations of twenty representative non-national UK 




What can be done? First we consider the possibilities, and difficulties, of rigorously 
measuring media plurality – a necessary basis for any legal and/or regulatory prohibition of 
further concentration - and then, given our view that economic changes in the sector driving 
closures and mergers are likely to be of long standing, whether effective alternative remedies 
are available to policy makers. 
3. Assessing plurality. 
There is no quick fix to the assessment, still less the measurement, of media plurality (see 
Iosifides 2010). But as it becomes a regulatory concept, pronounced upon by agencies and 
litigated in the courts, it is inevitable that a journey will be begun along the long road towards 
the development of more practicable data-driven ways of assisting judgement.  This process 
has already been started in the US, the EU and the UK – with mixed results. In our view, 
some of the pessimism is due either to a mismatch between the degree of elaboration of the 
concepts underlying plurality and the available data, or to unrealistic expectations about what 
measurement can do in its initial stages.  
Any assessment or attempt to assign numerical values to pluralism must start with decisions 
about the scope of the content the plurality of which is to be assessed, the degree of 
granularity in specifying the relevant audiences, the universe of media capable of 
contributing to a plural supply, and the basic source of evidence or data. These issues are 
usefully discussed in Ofcom’s (2010a) work on plurality, undertaken as part of its evaluation 
of the consequences for plurality of a proposed takeover in the UK, now abandoned, by News 
Corporation of BSkyB, the satellite broadcaster and broadband supplier. An assessment was 
required of the Secretary of State (who charged Ofcom with this task) of whether the 
transaction conflicted with the need ‘in relation to every different audience….for there to be a 
sufficient plurality of persons with control of the media enterprises serving that audience’ 
(Ofcom 2010a: 4). Ofcom has since further developed its analysis in response to the mandate 
given to it by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport referred to at the start of this 
article (Ofcom 2012).  
In relation to the first issue – the scope of content whose plurality of supply is being tested – 
there is a considerable range of possible options, all or most of which might be appropriate in 
particular circumstances. For example, if the fundamental question concerned plurality in 
matters concerning the underlying values of society, the coverage, and any process of 
evidence-gathering, would necessarily be wide. If, however, the issue at stake was political 
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impact, then a restricted focus on the supply of news and current affairs would be appropriate 
(though this would not imply that fiction is free from political implications). Further, 
consideration would need to be given to the geographical scope of the enquiry: in the UK 
case the statute refers to ‘every different audience in the United Kingdom or in a particular 
area of locality of the United Kingdom’ (Ofcom 2010a: 4).     
Which media would be included?  If the focus were political, then those supplying news and 
current affairs would naturally be included. However, the principal platforms – newspapers, 
television and on-line – provide content of all sorts. In principle, non-news and current affairs 
access should be excluded4. Online included? The case for including on-line sources of news 
and current affairs gets stronger day by day. This immediately raises the issue of weighting. 
Some platforms, for example those using video, may provide a preferred service with a 
greater impact. Alternatively different platforms may have their own particular advantages. 
Any decisions about weighting will depend on objective data, such as levels of 
consumption/circulation, but also on matters which can be determined with less certainty – is 
the impact of broadcasting greater than that of print; does the “pull” nature of online media 
amplify/discount their effect relative to “push” media such as broadcasting?  
The final issue concerns the source of the basic data. Where there is strong interest in rates of 
change, this will be determined to a large extent by data coverage in early periods (and the 
periodisation chosen may significantly influence findings). It is likely that any such inquiry 
will include the collection of data on both reach (proportion of audience using a service at 
least once in a time period) and consumption (in hours per week or in proportion of audience 
self-reporting as regular users) and further, where one platform subcontracts its provision to 
another, a decision has to be made about whether to allocate the audience to the wholesale 
provider or to the retailer (or to split it).  
Ofcom’s 2010 assessment was focused on: 
- news and current affairs exclusively; 
- a national audience; 
- newspapers, radio and television, while on-line services were excluded; 
                                                          
4 This is not to imply that drama, documentaries and other programming genres are unimportant only that issues 
are both more acute in news and analytically more manageable when focused on the single genre of news. For 
an excellent discussion of the issues in respect of news see Ofcom 2007.  
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Measures of reach, and wholesale and retail consumption shares5 were utilised.  
In relation to reach and wholesale consumption, the resulting data are shown below: 
Figure 3. Percentage of regular news and current affairs consumers – 96% of UK population.  
 
Source:  Ofcom 2010a: 9. 
Ofcom’s analysis, Figure 3 above, underscores the importance of the BBC (and broadcasting 
in general) in the UK public’s news diet. In its 2012 report, Ofcom moreover noted ‘a 
potential risk that people who rely primarily on the BBC for news of not being exposed to a 
sufficient diversity of perspectives, contributors, subjects or treatment of news stories.’ 
Ofcom 2012, p. 42)   
The search for measures (or indicators) of plurality can be, and has been, likened to the 
search in competition law and policy for measures or indicators of market power. It took 
several decades to generate the consensus that operates today – that data, including share 
data, have  a role to play in making an assessment of market power, but there is no ‘silver 
bullet,’ in the form of a single piece of evidence, which can take the relevant competition 
agency immediately to a precise evaluation of market power. It is also fundamental to market 
power appraisals in competition law that they are made with reference to a defined market. 
Although analytical procedures are available to determine the relevant market, in most cases 
                                                          
5 Where company A provides a news service for company B, A is the wholesaler and B the retailer. 
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it relies on the decision-makers’ judgement, just as a decision as to whether to include on-line 
sources of news and current affairs does in the case under consideration here.      
In European competition law, a key threshold in the level of market power is the transition to 
‘dominance,’ defined as the ‘a position of economic strength  ... affording [the firm] the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent status independently of its competitors, customers 
and ultimately of its consumer’ (Whish, 2009, p. 174). Leaving aside the question of whether 
this definition might be adapted to describe a media universe without plurality, we note that 
in competition law and policy, a well-known single index of market concentration is the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl index or HHI. It provides a neat and economical way of assessing 
concentration and is calculated by expressing the market shares of all participants as 
percentages, squaring the individual percentages and adding up the result. It can range 
between 10,000 in the case of a 100% monopoly and 0 where there are a very large number 
of firms each with a vanishingly small market share. The application of the squaring rule has 
the effect of giving high weight to large firms. Thus a firm with a 20% share will add 400 
points to the index, which is twice the combined contribution of 200 points of two firms each 
with a share of 10%.  
Is there a logic behind the formula? In fact, it can be shown that under conditions there is a 
direct link between the size of the index and the expected mark up over costs in product 
prices (Belleflamme and Peitz 2010: 58-9).6 Nonetheless, its principal use in competition law 
is as one characterisation of market structure and as a filter to identify merger proposals 
where their impact on concentration is insufficient to warrant further examination. 
Applying the HHI to the Ofcom consumption data suggests the following contribution to the 
index of each media firm: 
  BBC                                  1369 
  News Corporation               144 
  ITN                                      144 
  Sky                                       100 
  DMGT                                   25 
                                                          
6 The key underpinning of this result is the so-called Cournot assumption, that each firm sets its prices on the 
hypothesis that all other firms will keep their quantities supplied at the existing levels. 
12 
 
  Trinity Mirror                        16 
  Northern & Shell                      9 
  Guardian                                   9 
  Telegraph                                  4 
Others (estimate)                       10 
Total                                       1830. 
On this basis, a hypothetical merger of News Corporation and Sky would increase the index 
by 240.7 However, it is notable that the resulting firm would still account for a share 
considerably lower than that of the BBC. 
So far, the discussion  has emphasised the parallels between indicators of pluralism and 
indicators of market power. But there are profound differences as well. One concerns 
‘internal pluralism’, the possibility that one part of a media firm will adopt a different stance 
on current issues than another. Doing so may enhance profitability, but it is less likely that 
strongly competitive internal competition between two goods or services produced within a 
single group will do so. The question of internal pluralism acquires a particular salience when 
a media firm, such as the BBC, is under a statutory or other obligation of impartiality. 
Impartiality is a fugitive quality and is, logically, discontinuous with pluralism. If impartiality 
were achievable there would be scant need for pluralism. But, of course, impartiality (though 
an attribute worth striving for) is unachievable and pluralism stands in for failure to achieve 
impartiality.  
Secondly, the fact that consumers of news and current affairs multi-sourcing (relying for 
news on different  firms over the same period) may have different effects than applies in the 
case of multi-sourcing other goods or services. In the latter case, multi-sourcing may show 
the ability to switch, but overall consumption market share may still be a useful partial 
indicator of market power. In relation to plurality, limited exposure at the consumer’s 
                                                          
7 (22 x 22) – (12 x12+10 x10). Co-incidentally, such a change in the HHI based on existing market shares would 
render a merger subject to further investigation by the USA Department of Justice. If alternatively, Sky left the 
market, and half of its audience  went to the BBC, the index would increase by 395, simply because the BBC 
had such a large share to begin with. 
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discretion to alternative sources of news may be enough to meet the public interest 
requirement for plurality.  
It took decades for a consensus to become established about how to assess market power, by 
applying expert judgement to a variety of structural and behavioural observations, and 
commissioning research into particular aspects. Work on such a consensus has begun but is 
far from being completed in respect of media pluralism. Can anything be done while this 
process (the success of which is not guaranteed) unfolds.  
4. The role of public finance. 
The consequences of the impact on content (particularly news) production of the above-noted  
shift of advertising revenues away from “legacy” media and to the internet (particularly to 
search engines) has been addressed differently in different countries. In Europe, France and 
the UK, as ever, provide a convenient vignette of the range of responses. In both countries, 
and in most European states (Australia, Canada, Japan, South Korea and elsewhere provide 
further cases in point), there is already a high (and in some countries very high) level of 
public intervention in media markets through the provision of public service broadcasting 
and, less important and not so widely spread, press subsidies), but recent developments have 
stimulated proposals for and the implementation of new forms of public intervention. The 
French Government, with its customary active interventionism, has required public service 
broadcasting to cease to take advertising (with obvious benefits to advertising funded 
commercial television in France); increased subsidies to the newspaper sector – notably by 
providing 600m euros in support over three years; offered free hard copy newspapers to 
young people; and imposed a levy of 0.9% on the turnover of telecommunications firms and 
ISPs for a content fund8. There has been no such bold initiative in the UK,  although the last 
Labour government (which lost office in May 2010) proposed to fund three pilot schemes to 
provide news (located in northern England,  Scotland and Wales) with  up to £47m over two 
years, the money taken from an underspent BBC budget line, initially identified for digital 
television switchover.9 However, the necessary legislation was not passed. 10  
                                                          
8 See EUBusiness 2010. The conformity of the French levy with European Union stipulations is a matter of 
dispute. 
9 See: http://www.culture.gov.uk/reference_library/media_releases/6782.aspx  
http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/broadcasting/6549.aspx 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/what_we_do/broadcasting/6721.aspx 
10 For informative and penetrating analyses of these issues in the UK context see House of Commons 2010, 
House of Lords 2008 and Ofcom 2007. 
14 
 
5. New initiatives and entrants. 
The decline of legacy media has been accompanied by a collapse of entry barriers and the 
blossoming of a host of specialist internet based media: websites; e-zines; Web 2.0 
collaborations11 manifesting the flourishing of what is variously been called “citizen”, 
“distributed” or “networked” (Beckett 2008) journalism or a “fifth estate” (Dutton 2007). 
And in the USA (and Australia), “crowd financed” or “community funded” sites, such as 
www.spot.us , have developed through which readers/supporters can contribute to the 
financing of enquiries, resulting in publication, proposed by journalists. However, despite the 
growth of news and comment internet sites/media and a host of blogs such sites tend to have 
a mayfly life. 
Despite the promise of “fifth estate” journalism and the contributions to pluralism made by 
new web based entrants to the UK media there are solid grounds for supposing that the basis 
on which authoritative, affordable and pluralistic public media have been available for around 
the last hundred years is falling away. In television, first resources and then consumption are 
shifting way from free to air to subscription (pay wall protected) television; in radio  no 
viable subscription model has been developed but, in the UK at least, advertising revenues 
are falling slowly though consumption is shifting faster to licence fee funded services; and in 
the press sector, advertising funded newspapers are (with the qualified exception of free 
sheets) in decline with no viable pay wall or other alternative emerging.  
The change in the advertising market seems, if the trends identified above are sustained, to 
presage a significant qualitative change in the general mass media environment: for legacy 
media, threats seem most salient; for new media, opportunities. But in both legacy and new 
media these changes point to considerable uncertainty about how the core social and political 
role of public media – to provide pervasive and affordable access to diverse, high quality, 
content – is to be sustained particularly in a context where mergers, closures and diminishing 
legacy media pluralism seems inevitable.  
                                                          
11 Much of the content of such sites, eg Wikinews, is dependent on material derived from legacy media. Paterson 
(2005) found that news websites were heavily dependent on a few sources, notably the international news 
agencies Reuters, AP, AFP and the BBC. And Davies’ (2008) account of a content analysis of more than 2207 
stories drawn from five top UK national daily newspapers argued that more than 70% of stories are derived 




Are online media satisfactory substitutes for legacy media? The answer is - not yet. Despite 
the fact that OxIS (Dutton, Helsper and Gerber 2009: 19) found that “The Internet has 
become the first port of call when people look for information, ”  as great as is the potential 
of “crowd sourced” media and  “webzines”, such as www.openDemocracy.net, and as 
impressive is the expansion of the consumption base of “legacy” media made possible by 
online access (enabling the UK based Guardian newspaper to aspire to the status of “the 
world’s leading liberal voice"12), online media do not have either the salience and  authority 
(or the resources) 13yet to challenge effectively legacy media, in holding to account the 
powerful or in acting as conduits for the democratic functions variously identified by 
followers of Mill, Habermas and Mouffe.  
Compare, for example, the UK’s most important political story of recent years, the Daily 
Telegraph’s 2009 release of data concerning UK Members of Parliament’s (MPs’) abuse of 
the Parliamentary expenses system and WikiLeaks’ 2010 release of US military and 
diplomatic Documents (c500,000). The Daily Telegraph’s release resulted in changes to the 
rules governing UK MPs’ expenses; MPs’ resignations; successful criminal prosecutions and 
so on. Whereas WikiLeaks’ release, though orchestrated with highly legitimised legacy 
institutions, has yet to exert a comparable impact. In the future, new media may acquire an 
institutional force comparable to contemporary legacy media’s. But, to date, they have not 
done so. However, there can be no doubt that legacy media’s capacity to hold the powerful to 
account is declining – and without a commensurate rise in the capacity of the online “fifth 
estate”14to hold politicians to account. But this decline is not a consequence of declining 
media pluralism – rather both declining media pluralism and declining media capacity to hold 
the powerful to account stem from falling media revenues. As Holznagel and Schumacher 
(2012: 9) claim “Das Internet” really does “ändert alles”15.  
 
6. What can be done?  
                                                          
12 See http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainability/strategy-worlds-leading-liberal-voice  accessed on 7.11.2011. 
see also Le Monde 2011. 
13 Of course, abundant revenues do not guarantee effective media performance: but adequate funding may be 
seen as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for such effectiveness. 
14 Our distinction between legacy and online media is a convenient analytical distinction, of course most legacy 
media have an online presence (though, thus far, without making much of a contribution to the bottom line); 
online and legacy media are symbiotic with respect to content; hybridised on/offline entities have developed and 
so on.  
15 The internet changes everything (authors’ translation).  
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The difficulties of objective measurement of concentration; the pressure of a changing 
advertising market, increasingly compromising the economic viability of “legacy” media and 
leading (almost) inevitably to further closures and mergers in many media markets; and the 
public service broadcasting elephant in the room, making regulatory action directed only 
towards private sector media concentration intellectually indefensible, makes recourse to 
traditional remedies – prohibiting mergers, requiring dis-aggregation etc – unlikely to be 
effective. What alternatives exist?  
First, a conceptual shift is needed. Focusing on prohibition of mergers and establishing a 
floor level for media concentration is unlikely to be effective when the economic base on 
which a pluralistic mass media has been established is fast eroding. Already there have been 
perverse outcomes arising from the implementation of “legacy” concentration regulation – 
such as the forced closure, as a consequence of regulatory requirements designed to inhibit 
concentration of ownership, of radio services following the merger of EMAP and Scottish 
Radio Holdings.16   Rather than conceiving of media pluralism as an objective to be realised 
by prohibiting mergers, it should be thought of as pointing  towards intervention designed to 
facilitate and encourage entry. Here Ofcom’s 2005 proposal for a Public Service Publisher 
(PSP) 17 deserves resurrection, in relation to the media content and structure under discussion 
here. Much would need to be done to develop criteria for eligibility for funding and 
assessment of performance but these matters are not our concern here. However, the current 
context is one in which extraordinary and damaging economies are being made in news 
gathering and provision; this is exemplified in the report, in a study (Ofcom 2011) of the 
proposed merger of Kent Messenger Newspapers and Northcliffe Media, that there is only 
one political correspondent in the whole UK local newspaper sector. Simply ensuring that 
there is a satisfactory number – whatever that number is to be – of media enterprises 
operating in a particular market is unlikely adequately to safeguard the public interest. Hence 
the need to  re-think matters in terms of encouraging supply rather than simply limiting 
concentration of ownership of a given set of activities. Pluralism in outlets (titles/services), 
though desirable, is but one element in an ensemble of forms of provision which are required 
                                                          
16 The Smash Hits service in Aberdeen, Ayr and Dundee closed so that the post-merger service offer conformed 
to what was then Ofcom’s concentration of ownership regulations. See Guardian 2006.  
17 A PSP would allocate public funds to foster entry and support media pluralism. See, inter alia, Ofcom’s News 
Release publicising its “request for comments” on its PSP proposal at 
http://media.ofcom.org.uk/2004/11/03/ofcom-invites-detailed-responses-on-public-service-publisher/ accessed 
on 14.11.2011.  
17 
 
if citizens are to have access to media which enable them to function as informed citizens, 
hold power to account and deliberate together.  
Second, both “old style” concerns about excessive concentration and the exercise of 
dominance and “new style” proposals for consideration of public support, eg on PSP lines, 
for qualifying firms (and particularly new entrants) point towards a comprehensive policy 
review of established public interventions and notably public service broadcasting. Recall 
that the BBC’s 37% share of  news consumption in the UK, when assessed by analogy with  
the HHI market concentration methodology, which attaches a high score to ‘large’ firms, 18 
represents  1369 in a total score of 1830, or 75% of the concentration measure. This provides 
additional grounds, at a time of overall public expenditure cuts, for allocating a portion of the 
broadcasting licence fee to non-BBC media players.19  
7. Conclusion.  
Diminishing media pluralism is a pervasive global concern. Tendencies towards 
concentration in the sector, driven by the quest to realise high potential returns to economies 
of scope and scale, have been amplified by structural change in the media advertising market 
which have significantly diminished revenues accruing to the legacy mass media. A symptom 
of this global concern has been a search for new methods of assessing concentration – that 
developed by the KUL (2009) for the European Commission is exemplary. However, such a 
methodology may be excessively complicated and vulnerable to criticism on the grounds that 
too many of the judgements involved in its implementation are just that – matters of 
judgement. Instead, a developmental approach to definition and measurement has been 
recommended similar to that successfully applied in competition law to address issues of 
market power. It is hard to avoid the expectation that, applied in a contemporary UK context, 
this will reveal that in the UK media environment the BBC will emerge  as a primary locus 
for concern in respect of diminishing media pluralism.  
However, this will be a long-drawn out and possibly fruitless venture. And regulation is not 
the only instrument available to address problems of declining pluralism.  Moreover, a 
fundamental change is taking place in the legacy mass media sector which makes such 
measures less and less effective. Advertising revenue, which has underpinned the economics 
                                                          
18 We repeat our earlier caveat about this ‘read across’.  
19 Precedents have been established by reserving a portion of the licence fee to fund the introduction of 
commercial television in the 1950s (in the event funding from the BBC was not required) and more recently by 
funding S4C from the licence fee.  
18 
 
of the sector for more than a century, is migrating away from legacy media. Business failures 
are likely to intensify – not least as media firms respond to declining revenues by 
closing/merging titles and services - and this points towards review and revision of 
established forms of public intervention. In a declining market, enforcing ownership limits 
may be counter-productive, in the sense that they may lead to the closure of salvageable 
outlets.  A better policy is to contemplate use of public funding of the new entrants and 
alternative voices to promote plurality. In the UK, this might best be found by “topslicing” 
the present, generous, public funding of the BBC.   
Thus essentially a two-track approach is suggested. One track is to encourage competition in 
the development of measures of pluralism and of the design of regulatory mechanisms to 
maintain it. The other is to ensure that current ownership rules are saving rather than 
destroying media products, while considering how existing desirable forms of public funding 
can best promote the objective of pluralism. In the UK the natural terrain within which this 
approach can be applied is the distribution of the compulsory broadcasting licence fee.  
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